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GATT and the VRA: Japanese
Automobile Imports and Trade
Protectionism
I. Introduction
The automobile industry is one of the largest and most visible
participants in the international trade system.' Public awareness of
the fluctuations in international automobile trade has come about as
a result of recent developments' and concerns 3 affecting the Ameri-
can automobile industry. United States lawmakers are currently
faced with pressure to take measures to aid the industry and pre-
serve the jobs that the industry provides. In dealing with this pres-
sure, the lawmakers must take into account the applicable provi-
sions4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).'
Article XIX of GATT provides an escape clause that permits a
signatory nation to temporarily disregard the concessions agreed
upon under GATT.6 A nation will attempt to invoke the protection
I. Comment, Imposing Import Restriction Under Escape Clause Provisions: A Case
Study of the Automobile Industry, 12 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 325, 325 (1982).
2. One important development was the United States Government bail-out of the
Chrysler Motor Corporation in 1981. This action spurred public debate over whether the fed-
eral government should loan money to ailing private industries. Because of the bail-out, the
American public experienced a heightened awareness of the current status of the American
automobile industry and the perceived injurious Japanese import situation.
3. One important concern has been the loss of employment and profitability of the do-
mestic automobile industry. As a result of these concerns, a protectionist attitude has devel-
oped among those directly involved in the domestic automobile industry, including labor un-
ions. Essentially, protectionist sentiments are well summarized by the familiar slogan, "Buy
American."
4. For purposes of this Comment, only the Article XIX escape clause provision will be
analyzed and applied to the automobile import problem.
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
6. Article XIX of GATT provides as follows:
Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products
I. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the
obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including
tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that con-
tracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause
or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or di-
rectly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of
such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent
or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to with-
draw or modify the concession.
(b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect to a
preference, is being imported into the territory of a contracting party in the
circumstances set forth in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to cause or
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of the escape clause when a product is being imported in such in-
creased quantities as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers of like or directly competitive products. 7 Over the years,
many of the provisions of GATT, including the escape clause, have
been creatively ignored in order to create protectionist, bilateral re-
straint agreements. 8 For example, the United States and Japan cur-
rently utilize a Voluntary Restraint Agreement (VRA) 9 to control
the importation of Japanese automobiles. Agreements similar to the
VRA have come under strict scrutiny in the international trade
arena because of their illegality under GATT.
This Comment discusses the international trade implications of
the VRA on Japanese - American automobile trade and the utili-
zation of GATT as a legal instrument for addressing the problem at
hand. The Comment begins with a basic overview of the develop-
ment of the import problem and the current status of the VRA. The
threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive
products in the territory of a contracting party which receives or received such
preference, the importing contracting party shall be free, if that other con-
tracting party so requests, to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in part
or to withdraw or modify the concession in respect of the product, to the extent
and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury.
2. Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph I of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES as far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford
the CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting parties having a sub-
stantial interest as exporters of the product concerned an opportunity to consult
with it in respect of the proposed action. When such notice is given in relation to
a concession with respect to a preference, the notice shall name the contracting
party which has requested the action. In critical circumstances, where delay
would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, action under para-
graph I of this Article may be taken provisionally without prior consultation, on
the condition that consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such
action.
3.(a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to
the action is not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or con-
tinue the action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken
or continued, the affected contracting parties shall then be free, not later than
ninety days after such action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty
days from the day on which written notice of such suspension is received by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, the application to the trade of the contracting
party taking such action, or, in the case envisaged in paragraph I(b) of this
Article, to the trade of the contracting party requesting such action, of such
substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under this Agreement
the suspension of which the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph,
where action is taken under paragraph 2 of this Article without prior consulta-
tion and causes or threatens serious injury in the territory of a contracting party
to the domestic producers of products affected by the action, that contracting
party shall, where delay would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to sus-
pend, upon the taking of the action and throughout the period of consultation,
such concessions or other obligations as may be necessary to prevent or remedy
the injury.
7. GATT, art. XIX (1)(a), supra note 5.
8. See infra text accompanying note 97.
9. The Voluntary Restraint Agreement (VRA) is discussed more completely in Section
V of this Comment. See infra notes 117-188 and accompanying text.
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Comment will then discuss the traditional applications of the Article
XIX escape clause provision of GATT, its shortcomings, and poten-
tial changes that would increase GATT's effectiveness in dealing
with the Japanese import problem10 and escape clause actions. While
other legal commentators have addressed these same issues, changes
in the the domestic automobile industry since the original imposition
of the VRA mandate a reexamination of the situation in light of new
developments.
II. Review of the Development of the Automobile Import Problem
The domestic automobile industry has acted as a catalyst for
growth in the American economy for over seventy-five years." The
industry promoted widespread demand for the automobile, which
was instrumental in converting the agrarian society into a more mod-
ern and mobile consumer society. 12 The automobile single-handedly
changed the face of the American economy by providing consumer
access to goods and services, a steady flow of commerce among cities
and states, and millions of jobs for citizens in production, distribu-
tion, and aftermarket products. 3
In the 1960s, automobile manufacturing was centered in the
United States and Western Europe." Chrysler, Ford, and General
Motors dominated the domestic industry, while the Volkswagen Bee-
tle was the only major imported automobile.' 5 At the time, Ameri-
cans did not need to consider lightweight, fuel-efficient automobiles
because of the relatively abundant supply of affordably priced gaso-
line. Thus, the American automobile industry produced large, heavy
vehicles with high horsepower, gas-guzzling eight-cylinder engines.
However, across the Atlantic, the Europeans were building small,
fuel- efficient automobiles in preparation for already rising gasoline
prices.'"
During this time of prosperity for American automakers, the
Japanese automobile industry was merely in its developing stages. It
was not until 1960 that Japanese manufacturing even reached a pro-
10. The term "problem" is used merely as a reference to the American automobile in-
dustry's perception that the influx of Japanese automobiles has caused substantial injury to the
domestic industry.




14. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N. PUB. No. 1712. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE U.S. AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY I (June 1985)
[hereinafter ITC PUB. No. 1712] (copy on file with the Dickinson Journal of International
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duction level of 165,074 automobiles. 17 During the ensuing ten years,
however, the Japanese refined their production methods and in-
creased output. During 1970, they produced 3,178,078 vehicles, an
increase in production capacity of roughly three million vehicles.18 In
record time, Japan had become a world-class competitor in the pro-
duction of subcompact automobiles. In so doing, it established a rep-
utation for efficiently producing quality automobiles with a reputa-
tion of reliability and high fuel economy.' 9
At the same time that Japanese automobiles were gaining popu-
larity, events on the world oil market substantially changed the com-
plexion of the American automobile industry. By 1973, Americans
faced the first worldwide petroleum shortage since the advent of the
automobile. 20 The shortage of oil and the forecasted gasoline prices
led to a diminished demand for the heavy, gas-guzzling American
automobiles." By early 1979, after substantial OPEC22 price in-
creases, the American automobile consumer was convinced that
smaller was indeed better.2 3 After the second oil crisis in 1980,
Americans were assured that the oil shortage was not just a tempo-
rary occurrence. 2 At this juncture, American automobile consumers
began to purchase the smaller, economical Japanese imports in rec-
ord numbers.25
The combination of the gas shortage and the availability of the
Japanese imports produced a crisis for American producers. Sales of
domestic automobiles dropped rapidly and most analysts predicted a
continuing downward trend. Industry employment fell enormously in
a very short time as the industry found itself noncompetitive after
having enjoyed unparalleled success in the past. 26 As a result, the
industry began a major overhaul of production facilities and automo-
tive design in an effort to recapture the market share lost to the Jap-
anese imports. The industry began retooling and redesigning existing
production and assembly lines, investing in more modern production
facilities, downsizing most model lines, and increasing worker pro-
ductivity. Both fixed and variable costs were cut as the industry uti-
lized less expensive and lighter materials and computer-aided design





21. McDonald, supra note 11, at 260.
22. "OPEC" is the abbreviation for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
23. McDonald, supra note II, at 260.
24. ITC PuB. No. 1712, supra note 14, at 1.
25. Id.
26. Id. at vii.
27. Id.
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While these measures eased the crisis, the industry sought addi-
tional help. The automobile industry representatives claimed that
they needed a respite from the influx of Japanese automobiles if they
were effectively to meet the Japanese import challenge. In 1981, in
response to intense political pressure from the United States, Japan
voluntarily agreed to limit automobile exports to the United States.2 8
More than five years later, the restraint remains in effect, and it
appears that it will continue for at least another year.2 9
1II. Current Status of the Automobile Import Problem
In January 1986, Senator John Danforth of Missouri led a con-
gressional delegation to Japan to deliver a letter to Prime Minister
Yasuhiro Nakasone and Michio Watanabe, the Japanese Minister of
International Trade and Industry.3 0 The letter contained the rather
curt warning that the United States considered it an inopportune
time for the Japanese to increase their automobile exports to the
United States. Essentially, the trip was part of the intense political
pressure placed upon Japan to continue the Voluntary Restraint
Agreement that was established in April 1981. Evidently, the pres-
sure worked. For the sixth consecutive year, Japan agreed to extend
the Voluntary Restraint Agreement for twelve months beginning in
April 1986.11 Shipments of Japanese automobiles from April 1986 to
March 31, 1987 will be limited to a total of 2.3 million vehicles.
32
The extension of the VRA was a politically heated issue. Ac-
cording to Keiichi Konaga, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry, the Japanese Government believed that
there was no economic justification for continuing the VRA.31 How-
ever, due to strong political pressure from the United States Govern-
ment and the threat of imminent protectionist legislation, the Japa-
nese Government felt compelled to continue the export limits.
Pressure to abolish the import restrictions is currently building
within the United States as well as in Japan. Several factors account
for the increased desire to re-open the domestic automobile market
to free competition. First, the statistics show that employment in the
domestic industry has improved remarkably since the imposition of
the VRA. 34 Similarly, the automakers have recovered from the losses
experienced in the late 1970s and have realized profits in 1983 and
28. See infra text accompanying note 135.
29. See infra text accompanying note 31.
30. Japan Heads Off A Showdown, TIME, Feb. 24, 1986, at 57.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Gawronski, Decision On Import Curbs Due in March, MITI Says, AUTOMOTIVE
NEws, Feb. 3, 1986, at 3.
34. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
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1984.35 Second, after extensive economic analysis of the VRA, it is
widely believed that the VRA has had an enormous cost to the
American consumer.36 Last, it is generally believed that the United
States, as a signatory nation under GATT, has an obligation to fol-
low the rules espoused in GATT when dealing in international trade.
The VRA is a bilateral agreement made outside the auspices of
GATT and contradictory to its terms.
In sum, the decisions facing government officials today in regard
to the continuance of the VRA will have significant implications for
the future legitimacy of GATT in the international trade arena.
These implications will be discussed in Section V. However, to fully
understand the implications of restrictive bilateral agreements such
as the VRA in connection with GATT, it is necessary to first ex-
amine the applicable provisions and procedures of GATT itself.
IV. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as a Tool for
Governing International Trade
A. Background
The world multilateral trade system works predominantly
within the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.37 Ninety countries are full signatories, one country applies
the GATT rules provisionally, 8 and thirty-one nations apply its rules
de facto.39 Some major trading countries, such as the Soviet Union,
35. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 161-168 and accompanying text.
37. It is estimated that approximately four-fifths of the world trade is conducted under
the obligations set forth in GAIT. See Trade Policies for a Better Future: Proposals for Ac-
tion, reprinted in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Report of Eminent Persons on
Problems Facing the International Trading System, 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 716, 743
(1985) (hereinafter Report of Eminent Persons].
38. GATT membership as of the end of 1984 is as follows:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin,
Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Re-
public, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany
(Fed. Rep. of), Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indone-
sia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea (Rep. of),
Kuwait, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauri-
tania, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Nor-
way, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda,
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
Tunisia applies GATT membership rules provisionally.
0. LONG. LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 135
(1985).
39. Report of Eminent Persons, supra note 37, at 743. The nations that apply GATT de
facto pending final decisions as to their future commercial policy are as follows:
Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Botswana, Brunei
Darussalem, Cape Verde, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Grenada, Guinea-
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China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Mexico, do not adhere to the obliga-
tions of GATT. 40 GATT provides the basic rules for the movement
of articles of trade and ways in which participating countries can
consult and resolve trade disputes that arise.4'
The development of international trade occurred rapidly and re-
quired a set of governing rules to which each nation could adhere in
order to effectuate legitimate trade agreements. GATT supplied
these rules and continues to do so today. Fundamentally, GATT is
binding only upon signatory nations. However, virtually all trading
nations look to its provisions as a governing force in international
trade. Thus, many international legal scholars believe that GATT
acts as a guiding hand in the international trade arena, whether or
not the trading nations profess to follow its provisions.
Critics assert that one of GATT's principle shortcomings is its
unresponsiveness to modern trade intricacies. In practice, many of
the signatory nations ignore relevant procedures required by GATT
for retaliatory actions." Furthermore, the critics state that GATT is
not accomplishing one of its primary objectives. In particular, the
critics claim that GATT has failed to provide adequate directives to
help governments deal with the pressures from domestic producers
who seek protectionist actions. 3
A related problem occurs when GATT is used in a context that
its framers never intended. 44 Initially, the instrument was intended
to function as a reciprocal tariff reduction agreement. More recently,
however, it has been utilized to resolve international trade conflicts
and to address nontariff concessions .' As GATT is increasingly used
for purposes for which it was not intended, the shortcomings of the
instrument begin to surface, creating obstacles that interfere with
effective utilization of its provisions.
In an attempt to update GATT provisions and to assure its con-
tinued vitality as a governing body of international law, GATT
members hold negotiations at regularly scheduled intervals. Seven
major GATT rounds of negotiations on tariffs and trade have been
held since the inception of the agreement. 4'6 The rounds have had a
Bissau, Kampuchea, Kuribati, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea,
Qatar, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Sao Tome and
Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tonga, Tuvalu, United Arab
Emirates, Yemen (Democratic).
0. LONG, supra note 38, at 136.
40. Report of Eminent Persons, supra note 37, at 743.
41. Id. at 724.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 726.
44. Comment, supra note I, at 330.
45. Id. at 331.
46. CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 3 (P. Macrory & P.
Suchman eds. 1982). The list of seven rounds is as follows:
Fall 1986]
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remarkable record of lowering the general level of tariffs at each
conference.' 7 As tariffs ceased posing major problems, the focus of
the conferences shifted primarily to nontariff barriers in trade.' In-
deed, such nontariff barriers were the primary focus of the most re-
cent Tokyo Round.4
9
Many noted international legal scholars have examined GATT
and its implications upon international trade law. While the conclu-
sions of those who study the treaty vary, one general conclusion al-
ways prevails - GATT is remarkably complex and difficult to ap-
ply.50 Nevertheless, GATT does contain several basic assumptions
that must first be examined before turning to its particular
provisions.
First, GATT advocates nondiscrimination among trading na-
tions, with all signatory nations enjoying "unconditional most-
favoured-nation treatment." 5' 1 Some exceptions have been allowed to
I. Geneva, Switzerland (1947)
2. Annecy, France (1948)
3. Torquay, England (1950)
4. Geneva, Switzerland (1956)
5. Geneva, Switzerland (1960 - 1961) - The Dillon Round
6. Geneva, Switzerland (1964 - 1967) -The Kennedy Round
7. Geneva, Switzerland (1973 - 1979) - The Tokyo Round
Id.
47. These rates are now generally fixed or bound at levels ranging typically from four to
ten percent of the import value of the item. Report of Eminent Persons, supra note 37, at 725.
48. Examples of nontariff barriers are quantitative restraints such as quotas, domestic
content laws, taxes, orderly marketing agreements, and voluntary restraint agreements. See
generally, Matsushita & Repeta, Restricting the Supply of Japanese Automobiles: Sovereign
Compulsion or Sovereign Collusion?, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 47 (1982); Roy & Rassuli,
International Trade Barriers and the United States Automobile Industry, 14 U. TOL. L. REV.
263 (1983); Comment, Regulating Japanese Automobile Imports: Some Implications of the
Voluntary Quota System, 5 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 431 (1982); Comment, An Update of
the Japanese Automobile Export Restraint, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 159 (1982); Comment,
supra note I; Comment, Orderly Marketing Agreements: Analysis of United States Automo-
bile Industry Efforts to Obtain Import Relief, 6 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 161
(1982); Comment, Car Wars: Auto Imports and the Escape Clause, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 591 (1981).
49. CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 46, at 4.
50. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT vii (1969). In the preface to
his book on GATT, John Jackson includes the statements of a few individuals who have ex-
amined GATT only to be confused and perplexed by its provisions. Those statements are as
follows:
"Anyone who reads GATT is likely to have his sanity impaired." - Senator
Millikin on GATT, at the 1951 Senate Hearings, Senate Finance Committee,
page 92;
"[O]nly the learned can communicate with it, and then only in code." -
Herbert Feis, speaking of the ITO Charter, quoted in WILCOx, A CHARTER FOR
WORLD TRADE 189 (1949), from H. FEIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 42
(1948);
"1 think your difficulty ... is the inherent complexity of the subject .... I
must admit I am thoroughly confused." - Winthrop Brown, one of the drafts-
men of GATT, testifying at the 1951 Senate Hearings, Senate Finance Commit-
tee, pages 1061, 1076.
Id.
51. Report of Eminent Persons, supra note 37, at 724. Essentially, unconditional most-
favored-nation status (MFN) prohibits the signatory nation from treating any other nation
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this provision, so long as certain criteria are met.52 However, the
principal concern of GATT is nondiscrimination, and the concept of
reciprocity among trading nations plays an important role in trade
negotiations and membership in GATT.5 3
A second basic presumption of GATT is that import protection-
ism is detrimental to the system of international trade.54 All
nontariff and quantitative restrictions should be eliminated in favor
of freer trade. Occasionally, trade tariffs may be imposed upon all
nations equally and indiscriminately when it is determined that do-
mestic industries are being injured by increased imports. 55
Last, an important concept embodied in GATT, and critical for
the enforcement of GATT obligations, is the provision for surveil-
lance.5" Participating nations have an ongoing obligation to publish
trade measures and to consult with other governments so that com-
pliance with GATT can be established. In this manner, the entire
GATT contingency, as well as the GATT Council, act as a watch-
dog to help enforce the provisions of the agreement.
Some legal commentators have referred to the law of GATT as
"soft law" because of its many exceptions and provisions for suspen-
sion or withdrawal of GATT obligations. 7 One such provision is the
Article XIX escape clause, which allows a signatory nation to sus-
pend its obligations under GATT in the event of certain articulated
contingencies. This provision is discussed in detail in the following
sub-section.
B. The Article XIX Escape Clause
There are several safeguard clauses in GATT.5 8 However, one
that plays a crucial role in the implementation of GATT obligations
is contained in Article XIX, which is entitled "Emergency Action on
Imports of Particular Products." The placement of this safeguard
clause in GATT represents two contradictory objectives. The first
objective is to encourage member nations to adhere to commitments
for trade liberalization. The second objective, contrary to the first, is
to allow nations to retain the leverage to protect their domestic mar-
preferentially in international trade. Any trade preference or restriction levied against one na-
tion must be extended to all nations equally.
52. Id. at 743. Exceptions have been provided for customs unions and free-trade areas
that provide preferential treatment towards each other as long as no new trade barriers are
raised and all, trading within the group is unrestrained. Additionally, a 1979 exception allows
trade preferences to be given to developing countries.
53. Id. at 744.
54. Id.
55. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
56. Report of Eminent Persons, supra note 37, at 744.
57. See, e.g, Comment, supra note 1, at 331.
58. J. JACKSON, supra note 50, at 556.
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ket from perceived injurious imports. 9 These contradictory objec-
tives thus present an obvious drafting problem. On one hand, the
safeguard must be perceived to be strict enough to assure all signa-
tory nations that the provision will be enforced. At the same time, it
must be flexible enough so that it does not discourage nations from
agreeing to it. Indeed, with the strong political and economic inter-
ests that are inherently involved in the decision to curb imports, it is
debatable whether an agreeable provision is possible to formulate."0
Article XIX has been invoked 123 times as of December 1984.61
However, many signatory nations have chosen to look for relief
outside of Article XIX in the form of voluntary export restraints or
other bilateral measures.62 This shift is due to increased disenchant-
ment with Article XIX, which is perceived as complicated and diffi-
cult to invoke. More specifically, some of the complaints lodged
against the practical application of Article XIX concern inadequa-
cies in its rules, lack of precision, limitations in conditions governing
its application, the obligation to give compensation, supervision by
contracting parties, and the risk of retaliation. 8
To address what was perceived to be the deterioration of and
disenchantment with the Article XIX rules, the nations present at
the 1973 Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations decided to undertake
an "'examination of the adequacy of the multilateral safeguard sys-
tem, considering particularly the modalities of application of Article
XIX, with a view to furthering trade liberalization and preserving its
results.' "64 Upon the completion of those negotiations in 1979,5 it
was apparent that a revision of the Article XIX escape clause was
necessary. One suggested revision was the "proposed safeguards
code," 66 which was aimed at overhauling the process by which a na-
tion would invoke the escape clause. Under the proposed code, a reg-
imented set of procedures would have to be followed whenever the
utilization of Article XIX was contemplated. 7 This idea acted as a
catalyst in persuading the contracting nations to establish a more
acceptable means of imposing safeguard measures. It was believed
that widespread participation in the revamping of the escape clause
would lead to greater adherence to the more favorable provision ulti-
59. 0. LONG, supra note 38, at 57.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 58.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 59 (quoting the Tokyo Declaration, paragraph 3(d), Sept. 14, 1973).
65. Comment, supra note 1, at 333. The reference is to the Tokyo Round of GATT
negotiations in Japan. These negotiations began in September 1973.
66. Id. at 333 n.62.
67. Id. at 334. The code set out procedures for public hearings and examination of all
relevant evidence before a safeguard measure could be imposed. Id. at 334 n.71.
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mately enacted.
At the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979, the question of change
for Article XIX was left essentially unanswered. However, it was
taken up again at the GATT Ministerial Conference in November
1982.68 These discussions also ended without a definitive conclusion,
and the discussion is an ongoing concern today. 9 Undoubtedly, the
objective of the reconsideration of Article XIX is to improve the
safeguard system through more predictable, clearer language and to
provide greater security and equity for both importing and exporting
countries."0
Regardless of its perceived shortcomings, the signatory nations
continue to rely upon Article XIX as the law." In fact, utilization of
Article XIX provides exporting countries with better leverage in re-
sisting the pressure from importing countries requesting voluntary
import restrictions. 1  The exporting country could simply demand
that the importing country adhere to GATT law and, if the latter
should refuse, the exporting country could appeal to all of GATT's
contracting parties.
7 3
The legislative history of GATT indicates that the inclusion of
an escape clause by the drafters of the treaty was strongly advocated
by the United States delegates.7 ' These delegates requested that an
escape clause be included to protect against injury to domestic indus-
tries from inflexible trade agreements.7 5 Often, trade agreements
were negotiated without escape clause provisions and market condi-
tions subsequently changed. Without an escape clause, the con-
tracting party would have to adhere to certain trade concessions,
even though the concessions could potentially cause substantial harm
to a competing domestic industry.e
GATT requires that certain prerequisites be met before Article
XIX is invoked.7 Generally, these prerequisites are to be strictly
68. 0. LONG, supra note 38, at 59.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 59-60.
71. In December 1984, there were 15 reported cases of GATT contracting parties utiliz-
ing the Article XIX escape clause. Id. at 60.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. J. JACKSON, supra note 50, at 553.
75. Id.
76. The purpose of including the escape clause in GATT, according to a United States
delegate, was
to give more flexibility to the commitments undertaken in Chapter IV. Some
provision of this kind seems necessary in order that countries will not find them-
selves in such a rigid position that they could not deal with situations of an
emergency character. Therefore, the Article would provide for a modification of
commitments to meet such temporary situation.
Id. at 554-55.
77. In order to invoke Article XIX, the following must be established:
(I) There are imports in such increased quantities:
Fall 1986]
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construed. In order to effectively apply GATT law and the provisions
of the escape clause, each of the prerequisites must be thoroughly
examined.
First, in order to invoke the protection of the escape clause, Ar-
ticle XIX requires that there be an increase in quantities of im-
ports. 78 This requirement appears to be easily construed - if the
quantity of imports of a certain good increases, the prerequisite is
met. Included by implication is the idea that the increase in imports
could be "relative" to the amount of domestic consumption. 9 That
is, the number of imported units could remain at the same level, but
a decrease in domestic consumption would trigger a "relative in-
crease." The inclusion of the concept of a relative increase opens this
Article XIX prerequisite to broad interpretation and possible manip-
ulation by those countries that want to invoke the protection of Arti-
cle XIX.' °
A second requirement of an Article XIX action is the showing
that the increased imports were (a) the result of unforeseen develop-
ments and (b) the result of fulfilling GATT obligations. 81 Generally,
the requirement that the increased imports result from the imposi-
tion of a GATT obligation encompasses a broad range of situations,
since virtually all internationally traded goods are covered by the
GATT obligation prohibiting quantitative restrictions.82 Thus, a na-
tion seeking to invoke the protection of the escape clause could show
that it had quantitative import restrictions on a particular good, but
these restrictions were eliminated as a result of the GATT obliga-
tion. As a result of such elimination, the nation experienced an in-
crease in the imports of that particular item. If the nation originally
did not have quantitative restrictions on particular goods, however, it
could still argue that the absence of import barriers, or the promise
(2) The increased imports are a result both of
(a) unforeseen developments; and
(b) compliance with GATT obligations; and
(3) The increased imports cause serious injury or threaten serious injury.
Additionally, Article XIX paragraph l(b) sets out a prerequisite involving
preference concessions.
id. at 557.
78. GATT, art. XIX, para. l(a), supra note 5.
79. J. JACKSON, supra note 50, at 558. For example, if the United States imports one
million Japanese automobiles per year, and two million automobiles are domestically pur-
chased, and American consumers purchase all of the automobiles available, then the total
import share of the domestic automobile market would be 3313%. If, however, the domestic
purchases fell to one million units, and the Japanese imports remained at the same quantity,
the proportion of imports to domestic consumption has increased and thus, a "relative in-
crease" has occurred. Therefore, the Article XIX prerequisite for increased imports is met.
80. Without the provision for a "relative increase," an exporting nation could effectively
avoid the first prerequisite to an Article XIX escape clause action by maintaining a constant
percentage of the particular exported goods.
81.. J. JACKSON, supra note 50, at 559.
82. Id.
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to refrain from enacting future import barriers, led to the increased
imports.
83
The additional "unforeseen development" requirement is much
more nebulous and difficult to define than the "GATT obligation"
requirement.84 Nevertheless, economic and social conditions affecting
the international trade arena are laden with possibilities for unex-
pected and unforeseen occurrences. Indeed, a nation seeking the pro-
tection of the escape clause could effectively argue that the increase
in imports itself is an unforeseen development.
85
A third requirement of an Article XIX action concerns whether
the increased imports cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers of like or directly competitive products.8 " This prerequisite
requires a determination of (a) whether "serious injury" exists or is
threatened and (b) whether such injury is actually caused or
threatened by increased imports.87 GATT does not define the term
"serious injury"; therefore, it has been left to the interpretation of
various GATT Working Parties.88
The fourth requirement to an Article XIX action concerns pref-
erence concessions.8 9 A nation that has enjoyed a preference90 in an-
other market and is subsequently injured by reason of a change in
that preference may fall within the provisions of the escape clause.
In order to do so, it must meet the additional aforementioned
prerequisites.
The remedy afforded a nation that qualifies for an Article XIX
escape clause action is essentially "to suspend the relevant obligation
in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession in re-
83. Id. at 560.
84. The GATT Working Party that was established to study the United States invoca-
tion of Article XIX against the Czechoslovakian hatters' furs concluded that "'[Unforeseen
development' should be interpreted to mean developments occurring after the negotiation of
the relevant tariff concession which it would not be reasonable to expect that the negotiators of
the country making the concession could and should have foreseen at the time when the con-
cession was negotiated." Id. at 560-61 (quoting Report on the Withdrawal by the United
States of a Tariff Concession Under Article XIX of the GATT, Geneva, Nov. 1951 (Sales No.
GATT/1951-53)) (see infra note 88) [hereinafter Hatters' Fur Case].
85. Id. at 561.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The GATT Working Party in the Hatters' Fur case attempted to determine what
constituted serious injury to the domestic producers of hatters' furs. In so doing, they were
unsuccessful in establishing a standard or test that subsequent cases could follow. They did
conclude, however, that Czechoslovakia (the complainant) had failed to show that serious in-
jury, in fact, did not occur. J. JACKSON, supra note 50, at 562-63.
89. GATT, art. XIX, para. 1(b), supra note 5.
90. The following situation is illustrative of an instance in which a preference concession
would invoke the Article XIX escape clause. The United States exports certain goods to Japan
and, in return, obtains a preference from Japan. Under GATT, Japan granted Great Britain a
concession to reduce the preference to the United States. As a result, Great Britain's exports
to Japan tend to oust the United States producers in the Japanese market. Here, Japan may
have the right under Article XIX to withdraw the concession to Great Britain, which in turn
would be beneficial to the United States.
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spect of the product, to the extent and for such time as may be nec-
essary to prevent or remedy such injury." 9' In pursuing this remedy,
the nation must follow some specific guidelines, and it may open it-
self to retaliatory action by the affected nations.
92
For example, GATT Article XIX, paragraph three, authorizes
the target country to retaliate against the nation that is claiming the
escape clause protection.93 However, the drafters of Article XIX en-
visaged that the parties would come to agreement under the provi-
sions of paragraph two, which contains a notice provision requiring
the parties to consult about the proposed action,94 thereby alleviating
the need for retaliatory action. There was hope that any disputes
would be resolved through negotiation and arrangement of counter-
balancing concessions.9" Thus, it behooves the nation seeking to in-
voke the escape clause to resolve the problem through negotiation
and mutual agreement, for if an agreement is not reached, the target
nation is entitled to respond according to the dictates of Article
XIX.96
91. GATT, art. XIX, para. 1(b), supra note 5.
92. Jackson summarizes the guidelines as follows:
I. Generally, written advance notice must be given the Contracting Parties
and an opportunity to consult afforded; an exception to this is made for "critical
circumstances where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to
repair";
2. The phrasing of the remedy implies that the obligation withdrawn must
relate causally to the increase in imports;
3. The withdrawal is to be only "to the extent and for such time as may be
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury";
4. The withdrawal is to be "in respect of such product," i.e., the imported
product causing the injury;
5. Although nowhere expressly mentioned in the language, the preparatory
work and subsequent GATT practice make it clear that the withdrawal or sus-
pension shall be on a non-discriminatory MFN basis.
J. JACKSON, supra note 50, at 564.
93. GATT, art. XIX, para. 3, supra note 5.
94. J. JACKSON, supra note 50, at 564, qualification number (I).
95. For example, if the United States feels that Japanese imports of automobiles are
causing "substantial injury" to the domestic automobile industry, the United States could
withdraw from the GATT obligation. The GATT drafters assumed that this would be accom-
plished through raising automobile tariffs. The Japanese, having been given notice of the im-
pending tariff change, would then meet with the United States trade representatives to consult
about the proposed action. The United States may then offer Japan a lower tariff concession
on computer products imported to the United States that would adequately compensate the
Japanese for the withdrawal of the automobile concessions. Conversely, Japan could withdraw
a concession on the United States exports of grain to Japan. In so doing, a balance could be
amicably negotiated. Id. at 565.
96. Jackson summarizes those actions as follows:
I. Thirty days written notice of the action must be given and the action
must occur no later than ninety days after the initial action by the invoker. This
time limit may be uniformly extended by action of the contracting parties under
the waiver power when such extension is requested;
2. The counterresponse allowed is to suspend the application of substantially
equivalent concessions or other GATT obligations to the trade of the invoker.
This implies discriminatory treatment against the invoker, contrary to the in-
voker's right of suspension or withdrawal; and
3. The Contracting Parties do not disapprove.
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C. Proposals for Reform
Since the implementation of GATT, signatory nations have cre-
atively attempted to avoid the dictates of Article XIX by alleging
new injuries and resolutions in order to justify protectionist sanc-
tions. 7 Discriminatory, bilateral, and restrictive agreements, all of
which fall outside of the scope of GATT, have been invoked. Japan,
in particular, has been involved in many of the restraint agreements,
partly because of its own protectionist reputation and partly because
of its unparalleled success with exported products. 98 While such
agreements provide a temporary solution to increased import
problems, the closed, restricted markets created by imposing bilat-
eral restrictions inevitably will have a choking effect on the free
movement of goods in international trade.
Some economists presuppose that dissolution of international
trade barriers will lead to a better allocation of world resources. Pro-
duction of certain goods would fall upon those who are the most ca-
pable of cheaply and efficiently producing the goods. Consequently,
the inefficient producer would be forced to relinquish its share of the
market to a more competitive foreign importer.99 Thus, some domes-
tic industries would bear the burden of the shift to freer trade. Em-
ployment in the particular industry would suffer as the more compet-
itive foreign producer begins to take over the market.
Therefore, one of the most pressing economic and political chal-
lenges before a government attempting to dissolve international trade
barriers ultimately would be worker displacement and unemploy-
ment.100 In response to this displacement and unemployment, the af-
fected domestic industry would most likely appeal to its own
lawmakers to help alleviate the problems allegedly created by the
increased imports. The pressure placed upon the government would
most likely be in the form of a request for protectionist legislation.
Thus, even though the government could expect to benefit in the long
run from freer trade, it might nonetheless feel compelled to respond
to the pleas for relief from the domestic industry.
One suggestion to alleviate the rapid influx of an imported good
is a more gradual move to a freer market.101 For instance, if the
American automobile industry perceives the increased imports of
Japanese automobiles as threatening serious injury to the domestic
Id. at 566.
97. Report of Eminent Persons, supra note 37, at 725.
98. Id. The United States and Japan are currently utilizing a Voluntary Restraint
Agreement on the export of Japanese automobiles. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
99. Jackson refers to this concept as the "cost of market adjustment." See J. JACKSON,
supra note 50, at 568.
100. Report of Eminent Persons, supra note 37, at 721.
101. J. JACKSON, supra note 50, at 570.
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automobile industry, the two nations could agree to a "schedule" of
imports that would allow the ailing industry to compensate over
time. Herein lies the shortcoming of GATT. Article XIX of GATT
focuses upon the ailing nation's protectionist feelings rather than a
workable manner of market readjustment. 102 The inclusion of a pro-
vision for an "import schedule" in the Article XIX escape clause
provision would encourage compliance with the GATT provisions
without the enactment of domestic protectionist legislation. Addi-
tionally, the provision would allow the threatened nation to substan-
tially comply with the provisions of GATT while at the same time
avoiding the political pressures from the ailing industry. In the ab-
sence of a provision that allows for market readjustment, some ex-
porting countries have developed self-limiting restrictions in response
to pressure from the importing nations. These restrictions,'"' which
are violative of Article XIX, will be examined more thoroughly
herein.
In November 1983, the Director-General of GATT appointed
seven eminent persons,' 0 ' knowledgeable in the application of GATT
in international trade, to study and report independently upon the
problems facing the international trade system and GATT. The
group concluded their study in March 1985 with a report that ar-
ticulated fifteen recommendations for the multilateral trade sys-
tem.' 0 ' Several of the recommendations warrant discussion in the
102. Id. at 570-71.
103. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
104. The following is a list of the seven individuals appointed to study GATT:
I. Senator Bill Bradley - Senator Bradley is a member of the Senate Com-
mittee on Finance and the Subcommittee on International Trade.
2. Pehr G. Gyllenhammar - Mr. Gyllenhammar chairs the informal
Roundtable of European Industrialists.
. 3. Guy Ladreit de Lacharriere - Mr. de Lacharriere is the Vice President
of the International Court of Justice.
4. Fritz Leutwiler - Mr. Leutwiler served as Chairman for the investiga-
tion and report and served until 1984 as Chairman of the Swiss National Bank
and President of the Bank for International Settlements.
5. Indrar -asad G. Patel - Mr. Patel serves as Director of the London
School of Economics and Political Science.
6. Mario Henrique Simonsen - Mr. Simonsen serves as Director of the
Postgraduate School of Economics of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, Rio De
Janeiro.
7. Sumitro Djojohadikusomo - Mr. Djojohadikusomo serves as Professor
of Economics at the University of Indonesia.
Report of Eminent Persons, supra note 37, at 740.
'105. The fifteen proposals for action are as follows:
I. In each country, the making of trade policy should be brought into the
open. The costs and benefits of trade policy actions, existing and prospective,
should be analyzed through a "protection balance sheet." Private and public
companies should be required to reveal in their financial statements any subsi-
dies received. Public support for open trade policies should be fostered.
2. Agricultural trade should be based on clearer and fairer rules, with no
special treatment for particular countries or commodities. Efficient agricultural
producers should be given the maximum opportunity to compete.
[Vol. 5:1
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context of the Japanese - American automobile trade situation.
One of the conclusions of the study indicates that the applica-
tion of import restrictions such as voluntary restraint agreements,
orderly marketing agreements, and discriminatory import restric-
tions all directly contravene the dictates of GATT.106 Since these
agreements were designed to avoid the rules of GATT, they have the
effect of weakening the authority of the GATT system. Therefore,
the suggestion is that a program should be implemented to systemat-
ically abolish all of the illegal restrictions by first identifying the ille-
3. A timetable and procedures should be established to bring into conform-
ity with GATT rules voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing agreements,
discriminatory import restrictions, and other trade policy measures of both de-
veloped and developing countries which are inconsistent with the obligations of
contracting parties under the GATT.
4. Trade in textiles and clothing should be fully subject to the ordinary rules
of the GATT.
5. Rules on subsidies need to be revised, clarified and made more effective.
When subsidies are permitted they should be granted only after full and detailed
scrutiny.
6. The GATT "codes" governing non-tariff distortions of trade should be
improved and vigorously applied to make trade more open and fair.
7. The rules permitting customs unions and free-trade areas have been dis-
torted and abused. To prevent further erosion of the multilateral trading system,
they need to be clarified and tightened up.
8. At the international level, trade policy and the functioning of the trading
system should be made more open. Countries should be subject to regular over-
sight or surveillance of their policies and actions, about which the GATT1 Secre-
tariat should collect and publish information.
9. When emergency "safeguard" protection for particular industries is
needed, it should be provided only in accordance with the rules: it should not
discriminate between different suppliers, should be time-limited, should be linked
to adjustment assistance, and should be subject to continuing surveillance.
10. Developing countries receive special treatment in the GATT rules. But
such special treatment is of limited value. Far greater emphasis should be placed
on permitting and encouraging developing countries to take advantage of their
competitive strengths, and on integrating them more fully into the trading sys-
tem, with all the appropriate rights and responsibilities that this entails.
II. Governments should be ready to examine ways and means of expanding
trade in services, and to explore whether multilateral rules can appropriately be
devised for this sector.
12. In support of improved and strengthened rules, GATT's dispute settle-
ment procedures should be reinforced by building up a permanent roster of non-
governmental experts to examine disputes, and by improving the implementation
of panel recommendations. Third parties should use their rights to complain
when bilateral agreements break the rules.
13. We support the launching of a new round of GATT negotiations, pro-
vided they are directed toward the primary goal of strengthening the multilat-
eral trading system and further opening world markets.
14. To ensure continuous high-level attention to problems in international
trade policy, and to encourage prompt negotiation of solutions to them, a perma-
nent Ministerial-level body should be established in GATT.
15. The health and even the maintenance of the trading system, and the
stability of the financial system, are linked to a satisfactory resolution of the
world debt problem, adequate flows of development finance, better international
coordination of macroeconomic policies, and greater consistency between trade
and financial policies.
Id. at 720.
106. Id. at 734.
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gal restrictions, then converting them into nondiscriminatory mea-
sures, and ultimately eliminating them over a period of time
agreeable to the nations involved.'
Another conclusion of the study is that whenever the safeguard
provision of Article XIX has been invoked, it has been invoked in a
discriminatory manner." 8 Indeed, the disagreement over this central
and crucial element of GATT and its application has led to the
weakening of GATT authority. Most of the discussion concerning
the application of the escape clause centers around whether the safe-
guard clause may be imposed on one or more countries alleged to
have been causing the harm or whether it should apply to all suppli-
ers of the similar good indiscriminately.' 0 9 Clearly, GATT requires
the nondiscriminatory application. However, those who oppose that
approach claim that across-the-board restrictions would unnecessa-
rily disrupt the balance of trade. In response to this assertion, propo-
nents of GATT claim that across-the-board restrictions put more
pressure on the domestic industry to adjust and become more com-
petitive in the particular industry. Additionally, the government's
decisionmakers will be more reluctant to impose restrictions on all of
its suppliers than they would be to coerce one supplier to enter into
export restraints."x0 Thus, the nondiscrimination requirement places
a heavy burden upon the decisionmaker to resist the temptation of
suggesting or imposing such restrictions.
In order to prevent any such deviation from the rules of GATT,
the GATT requirements could be reinforced to absolutely forbid dis-
criminatory acts in escape clause actions."' More specifically, the
provision could expressly prohibit voluntary restraint agreements and
similar bilateral agreements. In addition, specific multilateral sanc-
tions would follow from any violation. Thus, the threat of enforcea-
ble sanctions would act as an incentive for the signatory nations to
toe the line in respect to GATT obligations, specifically in regard to
nondiscriminatory use of the escape clause.
Additionally, the nation invoking the escape clause protection of
Article XIX should be limited to imposing tariffs as opposed to
quantitative restrictions."' A tariff is a "list or schedule of articles
on which a duty is imposed upon their importation into the United
States, with the rates at which they are severally taxed." '"3 Specifi-
cally, they are "protective if designed to relieve domestic businesses
107. Id.





113. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1306 (5th ed. 1979).
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from effective foreign competition; discriminatory if they apply un-
equally to products of different countries; and retaliatory if they are
designed to compel a country to remove artificial trade barriers
against the entry of another nation's products."'1 4 Since GATT was
originally established to monitor and control tariff concessions,' 1 5 its
use should be limited to this basic concept. The unilateral imposition
of tariffs in the event of an Article XIX escape clause action would
be easily accomplished, and statistical evidence would readily illus-
trate their effectiveness.
Finally, the tariffs imposed under the escape clause would be
systematically phased out over a predetermined period of time."1 B
The effected industry would then have a more definitive standard
upon which to gauge its timetable for recovery. Also, the GATT
committee responsible for policing the legality of the tariff conces-
sions would be able to monitor the phasing out process with some
accuracy.
V. The Voluntary Restraint Agreement as an Instrument to Con-
trol the Japanese Automobile Import Problem
A. Background
From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the American automo-
bile market underwent substantial changes in the domestic market
share of American versus imported automobiles. In 1957, the import
share of the market was merely 200,000 automobiles, representing
roughly three percent of the market. 17 By 1969, the amount in-
creased to one million automobiles. Less than ten years later, in
1977, sales of imported automobiles surpassed the two million
mark.16B This trend continued as the domestic producers' share of
the market dropped considerably from 1978 to 1981."' In January
1986, the International Trade Commission reported that 635,904 do-
mestic automobiles and 237,281 imported automobiles had been sold
to American consumers. This figure for imported automobiles repre-
sents 27.2 percent of the market, an increase from 24.9 percent from
January 1985.120 A recent Department of Commerce report predicts
114. Id.
115. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
116. Report of Eminent Persons. supra note 37, at 736.
117. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 1648, A REVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE U.S. AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY INCLUDING AN ASSESSMENT OF THE JAPANESE VOLUN-
TARY RESTRAINT AGREEMENT 18 (Feb. 1985) [hereinafter ITC PUB. No. 1648] (copy on file
with the Dickinson Journal of International Law or available from the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.).
118. Id.
119. The American automakers' share of the domestic market dropped from 82.2% in
1978 to 71.2% in 1981. Id. at I.
120. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 1814, THE U.S. AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY:
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that by 1988, more than four million of the 11.2 million automobiles
purchased by American consumers will be made abroad.12
The Japanese share of the United States automobile market
more than doubled from 1976 to 1980.122 The International Trade
Commission reports that from January 1985 to December 1985,
2,527,479 Japanese automobiles were imported into the United
States for consumer purchase. The comparable period from January
1984 to December 1984 indicates that total Japanese imports for
consumer purchase during that period amounted to 1,948,714 auto-
mobiles. 123 Thus, Japanese imports in 1985 increased by 578,765 au-
tomobiles over the 1984 figure. Statistics show that the United
States trade deficit for automobiles increased by almost fifty percent
from 1979 to 1984.124 A significant part of that deficit can be attrib-
uted to the additional 353,000 Japanese automobiles imported dur-
ing that period.' 2 5 The automobile deficit has remained substantially
unchanged since the 1981 imposition of the VRA.'2 6 During this tur-
bulent period of American automotive history, the industry suffered
record losses, 27  decreased automobile sales, and loss of
employment.
28
Economists and automobile industry analysts have proposed va-
rious theories as to the cause of the industry's problems. One com-
mon assertion that has generally been agreed upon is that the precip-
itating factor for the industry's demise was probably the change in
MONTHLY REPORT ON SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS 6 (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter ITC PUB.
No. 1814] (copy on file with the Dickinson Journal of International Law or available from the
United States International Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.).
121. Protectionists Overtaken, THE ECONOMIST, June 8, 1985, at 20.
122. In 1976, the Japanese share of the market was 9.3%. By the end of 1980, that
figure had increased to 20.9% of the domestic market. ITC PUB. No. 1648, supra note 117, at
35.
123. ITC PUB. No. 1814, supra note 120, at 2.
124. ITC PUB. No. 1648, supra note 117, at 4. In 1979, the automobile import trade
deficit was 2.1 million automobiles. By 1984, that number had increased to 3.0 million auto-
mobiles. Id.
125. Id. The following data is based on the official statistics of the United States De-
partment of Commerce. The figures show United States imports of automobiles from major
sources during 1979-84. (Figures are in thousands of units.)
Source 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Japan 1,617 1,992 1,911 1,801 1,871 1,970
Canada 677 595 564 702 835 1,060
West Germany 395 338 234 260 240 335
All other 217 188 147 163 188 235
Total 2,906 3,113 2,856 2,926 3,134 3,600
Note: The 1984 data is partially estimated. Id. at 7.
126. Id. at 2.
127. The American automobile industry recorded losses amounting to $4 million in
1980. Id. at 1.
128. Car sales decreased from 9.0 million units in 1978 to 6.0 million units in 1981.
Additionally, employment in the industry fell from 929,214 workers to 740,191 in the one year
period of 1979-80. Id.
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consumer preferences caused by higher oil prices. The oil shortages,
which were triggered by the Iranian Revolution in 1979, created an
American market for small, fuel-efficient automobiles.12 9 The domes-
tic automakers were unable to meet this demand, thereby causing
the American consumers to turn to fuel-efficient compact and sub-
compact Japanese automobiles. 130 Soon thereafter, the domestic au-
tomobile manufacturers singled out the imported Japanese automo-
biles as being a major contributing factor for the loss of employment
and the general decline in demand for American automobiles. For
the first time in its history, the American automobile industry be-
came noncompetitive in an area in which it was previously unparal-
leled in performance and quality. By early 1981, political pressure
was building to impose some form of import restrictions on the Japa-
nese automobiles. 131 In response to the political and economic pres-
sure to obtain import relief, Japan's Ministry of International Trade
and Industry13 2 chose to avoid potentially restrictive import legisla-
tion and voluntarily imposed an export restraint of 1.6 to 1.7 million
automobiles annually.' 33 Thus, a formal voluntary restraint agree-
ment13 4 was officially announced by MITI on May 1, 1981.138 The
VRA remains in effect today and was recently extended to limit
shipments of Japanese automobiles to a total of 2.3 million vehicles
until March 31, 1987.136
The United States was not the first country to appeal to the
Japanese for export relief. Italy made a request for relief in the
1950s when a bilateral agreement was reached, whereby each coun-
try agreed to accept one thousand automobiles from the other.'"7 In
1975, the United Kingdom negotiated an export agreement for Japa-
nese automobiles, and in 1977, France did the same.' 38 Likewise, in
1981, West Germany, Belgium, Canada, and the Netherlands nego-
tiated automobile export agreements with Japan." 9 The only major
European automobile-producing country that has not entered into a
VRA with Japan is Sweden. However, in 1983, Sweden's foreign
minister stated that its government was closely monitoring the situa-
129. Competitiveness of the U.S. Automobile Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th
Cong., Ist Sess. 126 (1985) (report of Citizens for a Sound Economy, R. Tollison & P.
Boettke) [hereinafter Competitiveness Hearings] (copy on file with the Dickinson Journal of
International Law).
130. ITC PuB. No. 1648, supra note 117, at 29.
131. Id. at I.
132. Hereinafter MITI.
133. ITC Pun. No. 1648, supra note 117, at 1. This figure has been adjusted annually.
134. Hereinafter VRA.
135. ITC Pun. No. 1648, supra note 117, at 2.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
137. ITC PUB. No. 1648, supra note 117, at 2.
138. Id. at 2-3.
139. Id. at 3.
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tion.' 1° All of these agreements remain in effect today and are sub-
ject to review annually.
14 1
The VRA was initially imposed so that the American
automakers would have a chance to retool and cut costs to meet the
Japanese challenge. Ironically, this was being accomplished before
the imposition of the VRA. By 1981, the average weight of Ameri-
can cars had been reduced by thirty percent from that in 1973.42
Similarly, fuel economy had increased as much as twenty-five per-
cent over the 1973 figure. 143 Investment in the manufacturing opera-
tions had risen by eighty-eight percent from 1975 to 1980.144 How-
ever, since the VRA was imposed in 1981, the domestic automobile
manufacturers have decreased real investment expenditures by thirty
percent.145 In light of the opportunity afforded the industry to in-
crease their competitiveness, it is rather startling to discover that in-
vestment has declined.
B. Effect of the VRA
Employment figures for the automobile industry are important
indicators for determining the effect of a bilateral trade agreement
such as the VRA. The VRA was ostensibly imposed to protect the
jobs of American automakers. Employment figures for the six major
automobile manufacturers showed a substantial drop of employment
from 1979 to 1982.146 However, since 1982, the industry has rapidly
recovered. As of June 1984, the industry employment figures showed
an increase in workers either called back to work or hired.147 Ac-
cording to the International Trade Commission, as of January 1986,
the domestic industry employed a total of 877,000 workers. 148 Lay-
offs of domestic autoworkers declined from 250,000 in 1981 to
60,000 in 1985.141 As of January 1986, the Commission reported
37,000 automobile workers on indefinite layoff. The 1986 layoff sta-
tistic constitutes a substantial reduction from the amount reported in
January 1985.150 Indeed, it appears that something has occurred to
preserve the autoworkers' jobs.
140. Id.
141. Id.




146. The total employment figures for 1979 indicate that 929,214 workers were em-
ployed in the industry. By 1982, that figure had decreased to 622,885. Thus, 306,329 workers
either were laid off, retired, or were terminated. ITC PuB. No. 1648, supra note 117, at 9.
147. Industry employment figures increased from the 1982 low of 622,885 to 720,448 by
June 1984. This represents an increase totalling 97,563 workers. Id.
148. ITC PUB. No. 1814, supra note 120, at 1.
149. Competitiveness Hearings, supra note 129, at 35.
150. ITC PUB. No. 1814, supra note 120, at 1.
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The VRA cannot be attributed as the sole cause of the the de-
crease in unemployment. As gas prices began to ease, the American
consumer again indicated a preference for the medium- to large-
sized automobile. Thus, the industry that had been labelled as unre-
sponsive to consumers' needs while only producing medium- to large-
sized automobiles suddenly encountered a resurgence in consumer
demand for those very models. Consequently, part of the reason for
the higher employment in the industry can be attributed to an im-
proved economy and the demand for the larger automobiles. In any
event, whether the increase in employment figures is attributed to
either domestic economic recovery or the VRA, it is nonetheless evi-
dent that the domestic industry has indeed recovered. Therefore, the
VRA as a tool to avert unemployment is no longer necessary.
It is undisputed that the VRA was initially established to help
the American automobile industry regain its competitive advantage
in the American market. As of late 1984, that goal was clearly ac-
complished. The big three automakers' 51 not only recovered, but
their profits soared to an all-time high and continue to do so to-
day.152 Compiled financial data, which encompasses the six domestic
producers of automobiles, 53 indicate that the industry experienced a
net loss on operations each year from 1979 to 1982. However, fol-
lowing the imposition of the VRA, the industry showed profits in
1983 and in 1984.154
Experts attribute this economic turnaround by the domestic in-
dustry to a combination of factors. One such factor contributing to
the industry's increased profitability, other than the improved econ-
omy, was the imposition of the VRA, which restricted the amount of
Japanese automobiles available to the American consumer. The do-
mestic producers capitalized upon the void created as a result of a
high demand for automobiles and the restricted amount of available
15 1. The domestic automakers commonly known as the "big three" are General Motors,
Chrysler, and Ford. Competitiveness Hearings, supra note 129, at 24.
152. Id.
153. ITC PuB. No. 1648, supra note 117, at 3 n.8. The six domestic manufacturers
included in this data are General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, American Motors, Honda, and
Volkswagen. Id.
154. Id. at 13. The following financial data represents the International Trade Commis-
sion figures used in the determination of net profit or net loss of the six domestic producers of
automobiles:
Item 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Net sales 88,413 72,100 80,734 79,495 108,003 131,000
Cost of
goods sold 88,813 76,767 83,030 80,048 102,673 119,600
Net profit
or (loss) (400) (4,667) (2,296) (553) 5,330 10,400
Note: 1984 figures were estimated on the basis of January-June 1984 data.
Id.
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imported automobiles.5 5 In effect, the domestic industry has realized
a net profit of 12.9 billion dollars during the years the VRA has
remained operative.' 5" Based upon the rate of sales observed since
the imposition of the VRA, it is projected that profits will continue
to increase as long as the VRA is continued.'57
Studies have determined that if the VRA had not been imposed
since 1981, sales of domestically produced automobiles would have
been lower than actually experienced. Conversely, sales of Japanese
imports would have reached higher levels in an unrestricted mar-
ket.1" In fact, although the sales of the imported Japanese cars
would not have continued to increase at the rate seen in the 1970s,
the International Trade Commission concluded that the Japanese
share of the United States automobile market would have increased
from twenty-one percent in 1980 to twenty-eight percent in 1984
with no import restrictions.'" While limiting the sales of Japanese
automobiles, the VRA helped to boost sales of domestically produced
vehicles. During the first year of the VRA, the increase in domestic
sales was negligible. However, during the following threeyears, sales
ranged from three to eight percent higher than they would have been
without the VRA.' 60
The VRA has also been blamed for across-the-board increases
in prices for domestic and Japanese automobiles."'1 One economist 16"
has estimated that the VRA cost the American consumer approxi-
mately thirteen billion dollars by increasing the average price of new
cars sold in the United States by 1,500 dollars. 63 Other industry
experts have suggested a more conservative figure of 700 dollars
added to the price of each domestically produced automobile by
1984.1" Regardless of the estimate one chooses to use, it is evident
155. Id; see also infra note 164.
156. ITC PuB. No. 1648, supra note 117, at 13.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 34.
159. Id. at 35.
160. Id. at 38.
161. Id. at 36.
162. Yoshihiro Tsurumi, Professor of International Business at Baruch College, the City
University of New York. Competitiveness Hearings, supra note 129, at 43.
163. Id. at 28.
164. ITC PUB. No. 1648, supra note 117, at 39. By combining various data, the Interna-
tional Trade Commission was able to tabulate its estimation of the import share of the domes-
tic automobile market that would have resulted absent the VRA. The results are as follows:
Actual Estimated Difference
1981 $8,929 $8,851 $78
1982 $9,889 $9,719 $170
1983 $10,504 $10,078 $426
1984 $10,998 $10,329 $659
Id.
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that the VRA increased the price that the American consumer paid
for an American automobile. Additionally, the price of used automo-
biles skyrocketed as a result of the higher prices being asked for new
automobiles. 165
The restricted market also drove up the price of Japanese auto-
mobiles. By decreasing the supply of Japanese automobiles, which
were in high demand, the dealers found themselves in a sellers' mar-
ket and utilized this leverage to increase the price of domestically
sold Japanese automobiles. Thus, the American consumer paid
thirty-nine percent more for a Japanese automobile in 1984 than was
paid in 1980.166 Evidence indicates that the price of Japanese auto-
mobiles in the United States would have been significantly lower
during 1984 without the VRA. 167 In fact, it is firmly believed that
the average price of a Japanese automobile would have been lowered
by up to thirty percent in 1984 if the VRA had not been
operative.168
C. The Economic and Political Cost of the VRA
Economic theorists have identified the restraint of free trade as
a costly venture for the consumers in any nation. One such promi-
nent economist was Adam Smith, who stated as follows:
In every country it always is and must be the interest of the
great body of the people to buy whatever they want of those who
sell it cheapest .... The proposition is so very manifest that it
seems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it; nor could it ever
have been called in question, had not the interested sophistry of
merchants and manufacturers confounded the common-sense of
mankind.' 96
A principal tenet of protectionism is that, ultimately, someone will
pay the price. Clearly the most logical reaction for the worker who is
being displaced by a foreign competitor is to seek help from the
lawmakers. The lawmakers, who are sensitive to the public outcry,
will be influenced by the strong contingency representing the
threatened industry. Such influence is easily imposed upon govern-
ment officials because there is rarely anyone who will lobby as
165. Competitiveness Hearings, supra note 129, at 28.
166. ITC PuB. No. 1648, supra note 117, at 36. In 1980, the average transaction price
for a Japanese automobile was $6,709. By 1984, that figure had risen to an average transac-
tion cost of $9,300. Id.
167. Estimates for 1984 indicated that subcompact prices would have been 21% lower;
compact automobile prices, 29% lower; sporty automobiles, 39% lower; and intermediate-sized
automobiles, 43% lower. Id. at 37.
168. Id.
169. Competitiveness Hearings, supra note 129, at 127.
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equally and as vocally for unrestricted trade. " ' Additionally, any re-
strictions imposed appear to have a miraculous effect upon the indus-
try. The industry workers keep their jobs and the product maintains
its share of the market.
Most economists argue, however, that these results are generally
short-lived and may lead to retaliatory repercussions that cause the
consumer to pay more in the long run. 17 1 These repercussions have
an effect upon the international diplomatic relations with the
targeted nation. It is generally believed that attempts to restrict, reg-
ulate, and manage trade by supplementing multilateral trading ar-
rangements with bilateral discretionary actions and exclusive trading
arrangements lead to greater hostility among trading nations.
172
Such has been the case with the VRA. The American consum-
ers have had to pay more for domestically produced automobiles17 3
as well as imported automobiles.174 Additionally, the VRA has
caused political hostility between Japan and the United States.
7 5
Each year, as the termination date for the VRA approaches, United
States trade representatives and government officials pressure MITI
to extend the VRA. This pressure has led to increased hostility be-
tween the two nations and will inevitably lead to Japanese retaliation
in the future.
Most economists agree that restrictive trade agreements have
detrimental effects upon the industry and its work force. Several rea-
sons lend support to this assumption. First, the idea that jobs will be
saved by a protectionist action such as a VRA is shortsighted. As a
result of less import competition, the protected industry will experi-
ence an increase in sales and gross profits. The profits will usually be
reinvested in capital expenditures for automated machinery, which
ultimately replaces the less efficient workers.1 6 Thus, the protection-
ist import restrictions merely postpone the loss of jobs. In the long
run, the loss in employment will be the same, possibly greater.
Second, the jobs that are saved through the import restrictions
will consequently cause a loss of jobs in the export industry.' 77 If the
United States purchases fewer Japanese automobiles because of the
VRA, it follows that the Japanese will have less money with which
to purchase American products. Thus, the export industry will suffer
a loss in revenue and, subsequently, a decreased need for workers.
170. Report of Eminent Persons. supra note 37, at 728.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
176. Report of Eminent Persons. supra note 37, at 729.
177. Id.
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Last, it is asserted that any time a country inhibits the selling of a
product within its own borders, those who buy the product are going
to have to pay more money to acquire it.
17 8
It can be argued that all three of the aforementioned situations
have occurred in the domestic automobile industry. First, there is a
move toward higher technology in areas of automobile production.
Automated machinery in production areas such as welding and
painting is already in place. Thus, many workers are losing their jobs
to more efficient, automated machinery. Second, analysts argue that
the Japanese are more reluctant to purchase American exported
goods as a result of the VRA. 17 1 Therefore, employment figures
could ultimately decline in the export industry. Indeed it has been
suggested that the number of jobs that are lost in the export industry
will surpass the jobs saved in the automobile industry by the VRA.
Last, statistics show that the American automobile consumer has
had to pay more money for an automobile as a result of the VRA.180
Change in the automobile industry is inevitable. However, the
way to go about that change is not through short-term and short-
sighted quotas or voluntary restraint agreements. s1 One way to alle-
viate the loss of employment and hardships caused by the change is
through aid to workers under the Trade Act of 1974.18s The Act
provides for worker retraining, job search and relocation allowances,
and unemployment benefits for workers displaced because of more
competitive imported products.183 By relocating the productive work-
ers in more competitive industries, the workers will realize increased
job security without the artificial government protection. They would
not be deceived by the false hope of job security in a protected in-
dustry, but rather will experience increased security in the more
competitive industry. It is true that vocational retraining is an expen-
sive proposition and requires a great deal of organization to effec-
tively apply. However, it appears that the inevitable loss of employ-
ment in the automobile industry through automation will have a
higher public cost than retraining productive workers for work in
more competitive industries.
In sum, proponents of protectionism will always find a reason
for protection to be continued. Once protectionism is imposed, more-
over, the industry will not willingly relinquish government protection
178. Williams, VRA Point/Counterpoint: A Healthy Dose of Restraint or a Liberal
Draft of Competition, AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES, July 1985, at 40, 41.
179. Id.
180. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
181. Report of Eminent Persons, supra note 37, at 729.
182. The Cost of Protecting Detroit, CONSUMER REPORTS, Mar. 1985, at 149, 150.
183. Id.
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from its competitors.18 Nevertheless, the immediate benefits are
usually short-lived, the unfounded sense of security eventually fades,
and protectionism results in a detriment in the long run. An illustra-
tive case of the failure of protectionist measures can be seen in the
case of the domestic steel industry. 185 That industry cried out for
protection, alleging that imported steel was causing loss of employ-
ment and profits. Subsequently, protectionist measures were invoked.
Ultimately, those who ostensibly benefitted from the protection
found it to be only a temporary respite from the greater harm that
has come to plague the industry today. 8 In the case of the VRA,
the protectionism has immediately benefited the stockholders, man-
agement, and workers of the domestic automobile industry at the
expense of the American consumers.18 7 In the long run, it costs the
American consumers more money to preserve the autoworkers' jobs
and, ultimately, the unfounded sense of market security will cause a
greater loss of employment. The legislators and automobile industry
lobbyists should learn the lesson demonstrated by the ill-contrived
protectionist measures implemented for the domestic steel industry
- the costs of import protectionism are too high. In short, it is ap-
parent the the VRA is an embarrassment to the sanctity of the free
market system and an unnecessary burden on the American
public.1 88
VI. The Outlook for the Future in Light of GATT and Voluntary
Restraint Agreements
The VRA limiting the number of Japanese automobiles to be
imported into the United States should not be renewed when it ex-
pires on March 31, 1987. The American automobile manufacturers
have had stellar years in 1983 and 1984. While this success is partly
due to the imposition of the VRA, falling oil prices as well as the
reversion to a consumer preference for medium- and large-sized au-
tomobiles also contributed greatly to the recovery. The American au-
tomobile industry is now capable of meeting the threat imposed by
the Japanese imports. Thus, the VRA is no longer necessary and, in
fact, is detrimental to United States involvement in international
trade. Therefore, it is time to relinquish the protectionist measures
that were invoked by the United States Government.
If the VRA is abolished in 1987, there is no real danger of an
uncontrollable surge of Japanese imports flooding the American
184. Competitiveness Hearings, supra note 129, at 13.
185. Williams, supra note 178, at 41.
186. Id.
187. Competitiveness Hearings, supra note 129, at 18.
188. Id.
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market. As gasoline prices continue to fall, the demand for larger
American automobiles will increase and the demand for Japanese
imports will be reduced. Additionally, now that the Japanese have
opened United States production facilities, it is unlikely that imports
would increase substantially because it would effectively harm their
own interests. Finally, the protection offered by the VRA has pro-
vided time for the American automakers to diversify their product
lines. Thus, the domestic automobile industry is now capable of pro-
ducing fuel-efficient compact and subcompact models to compete
with similar Japanese models.
Not only has the VRA outlived its usefulness, but many noted
economists believe that the VRA is now actually hurting the United
States economy. The VRA increases the price of imported and.do-
mestic automobiles, both new and used. It harms the American ex-
port industry by reducing the amount of currency available to the
Japanese for purchasing American exports. It exposes the United
States to the risk of retaliatory trade practices by the Japanese. Fi-
nally, it deprives the domestic marketplace of control over the alloca-
tion of employment resources by artificially increasing demand for
American automobiles.
In addition to benefiting the American economy, abolition of the
VRA will strengthen the entire system of international trade. As
previously mentioned, bilateral agreements such as the VRA are
outside the auspices of GATT; thus, they undermine its authority.
Because of the United States relative power in the international
trade arena, its failure to comply with GATT raises questions as to
the agreement's continuing legitimacy for governing international
trade. Eliminating bilateral restrictive agreements in favor of com-
pliance with the escape clause of GATT restores vitality to GATT
law. The need for retaliatory action is diminished and nondiscrimi-
natory trade practices are thereby encouraged.
In addition to abolishing all existing bilateral agreements
outside the authority of GATT, steps must be taken to prevent their
utilization in the future. GATT's provisions must be revised and
strengthened. An express prohibition against bilateral agreements
such as the VRA must be included. The original goal of nondiscrimi-
nation between trading partners must be reasserted. Protection from
imports should be in the form of tariffs instead of quantitative im-
port restrictions. Mandatory sanctions should be imposed for violat-
ing GATT's provisions. These measures would help reestablish free
trade among nations while still allowing each nation to respond ef-
fectively to threatened serious injury to domestic industries. Further-
more, these measures would enable GATT to address the intricacies
of modern trade practices.
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By abolishing the VRA, the United States will move closer to
the goal of remaining competitive in international trade. In the long
run, the consumer will benefit. As economist Adam Smith
proclaimed:
It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to
attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to make
than to buy. The taylor [sic] does not attempt to make his own
shoes, but buys them of the shoemaker. The shoemaker does not
attempt to make his own clothes, but employs a taylor [sic]. The
farmer attempts to make neither the one nor the other, but em-
ploys those different artificers. . . . What is prudence in the
conduct of every private family, can scarce be folly in that of a
great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a com-
modity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of
them with some part of the produce of our own industry, em-
ployed in a way in which we have some advantage. The general
industry of the country . . . will not thereby be diminished, no
more than that of the above-mentioned artificers; but only left to
find out the way in which it can be employed to the greatest
advantage.1 89
Gregory S. Kurey
189. Id. at 133.
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